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Abstract
Why do drug trafficking organizations sometimes prey on the communities in
which they operate but sometimes provide assistance to these communities? What
explains their strategies of extortion and cooptation toward civil society? Using
new survey data from Mexico, including list experiments to elicit responses about
potentially illegal behavior, this paper measures the prevalence of extortion and as-
sistance among drug trafficking organizations. In support of our theory, these data
show that territorial contestation among rival organizations produces more extor-
tion, and, in contrast, DTOs provide more assistance when they have monopoly
control over a turf. The paper uncovers other factors that also shape DTOs’ strate-
gies toward the population, including the degree of collaboration with the state,
leadership stability and DTO organization, and the value and logistics of the local
criminal enterprise.
1 Introduction
Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have employed different strategies toward the com-
munities in which they operate. Sometimes, these DTOs have exhibited “benign” rela-
tionships with these communities, providing them with assistance. For example, early in
its existence, the Mexican drug cartel La Familia Michoacana provided loans and grants
to individuals, businesses, and even churches within the communities where it operated.
These activities were widely known and even publicized in local newspapers. The DTO
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also allegedly targeted criminals from whom the community needed protection for “di-
vine justice.” In December 2010, when La Familia Michoacana lost its leader, hundreds in
Michoaca´n marched in support of the DTO with signs reading, “Long Live to La Familia
Michoacana.”1
Other times, the relationships between DTOs and their communities are predatory.
For instance, after the killing of its leader, La Famila Michoacana fragmented, and other
drug cartels such as Los Zetas, los Caballeros Templarios, and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva
Generacio´n disputed their territory. As these groups battled for control, the population
increasingly suffered from the ongoing violence - but also from extortion. These criminal
groups would charge “protection” fees to individuals and businesses to the point that, in
2013, Autodefesas – or self-defense groups formed by local entrepreneurs – took up arms
against the criminal groups that were preying on them.
These examples are not anomalies: other criminal organizations in Mexico have been
known for engaging in these strategies. For example, the former leader of the Sinaloa
Cartel, Joaquin el “Chapo” Guzma´n, reportedly prohibited his forces from kidnapping
people (a lucrative business for other DTOs); his organization also engaged in food dis-
tribution, provided subsidies to local communities, built roads and churches, and passed
out cash to win support – or silence – in the communities where the criminal group
worked. Similarly, former Gulf Cartel boss Osiel Cardenas paid for annual toy giveaways
in communities where the gang reigned and otherwise sought a good relationship with
residents.2
Los Zetas, one of Mexico’s largest criminal organizations, is also known for extorting
communities and businesses, killing anyone who refuses to pay. In Coahuila, the group
operated from inside the prison of Piedras Negras, where they would bring the bodies of
their victims to incinerate them. Hundreds are thought to have perished there, including
children and women. The prison also served as the criminals’ headquarters to store the
1From Jornada newspaper by Ferrer and Martinez (2013).
2The Washington Post, Kevin Sullivan and Jorday, June 10, 2004.
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drugs that would be hidden inside cars and subsequently brought into the U.S (Smulders
et al., 2017).
The Tijuana DTO, furthermore, also began kidnapping professionals and petit bour-
geoisie – e.g. taco stand owners, doctors, and engineers. To avoid being kidnapped,
business owners were usually given an opportunity to pay derecho de piso, a cuota (tax),
regularly. Apparently, these practices increased significantly when the DTO divided into
two factions, one led by Fernando Sa´nchez Arellano “El Ingeniero,” and the other led by
Eduardo Teodoro Garc´ıa Simental, “El Teo” (Jones, 2013).
These divergent strategies for engaging with civil society require explanation. Why
would drug cartels that pursue illegal profits sometimes diversify to other crimes (e.g.,
engaging in extortion, robbery, kidnappings, and other violations against the communities
in which they operate) but then at other times even provide assistance to these same
communities?
To answer this question, we focus on the drug war in Mexico, where violence has
surged since 2006. Drug-related violence occupies a gray zone between civil war and
violent crime (Kalyvas, 2015). Access to massive profits turns DTOs into powerful orga-
nizations, allowing them to recruit a large number of armed men to serve as assassins,
buy military arsenals to fight the state and rival DTOs, and buy off government officials
and law enforcement agents, in addition to choosing various strategies to engage with the
communities around them.
There is a vibrant scholarly literature on the logic of drug trafficking violence (Trejo
and Ley, 2017; Lessing, 2015; Castillo et al., 2013; Shirk and Wallman, 2015; Astorga and
Shirk, 2010; Phillips, 2015; Osorio, 2015; Dube et al., 2013; Lessing, 2015; Bagley, 2012;
Snyder and Duran-Martinez, 2009; Dura´n-Mart´ınez, 2015); however, DTOs’ strategies
for engaging with the communities they operate in remain under-theorized.
In their interaction with these communities, DTOs may exhibit patterns of coercion
and cooptation. With respect to coercion, we examine extortion, which we define as a
DTO charging fees for protection. In terms of cooptation, we explore when DTOs provide
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assistance to the community - loans, cash for health emergencies or burials - or assistance
in the form of protection, as discussed in Gambetta (1996).
To account for variation in DTO strategies toward civil society, this paper develops
a theory about DTO incentives and structure. A first set of variables that influence how
DTOs interact with the community comes from the civil conflict literature (Mampilly,
2011; Arjona, 2017; Kalyvas, 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006), among others,
which argues that armed rebels collaborate with the population in order to successfully
gain control of territory by supplanting the state or staking secessionist claims.
If DTOs do not seek to topple the state, but rather to make money from their illicit
activities, then why do these armed groups aspire to control territory? DTOs often
seek active control of a territory or “turf” not only to hide from the state and protect
themselves from other criminal groups, but also to extract profits from the illegal trade
connected to a given territory. DTOs aspire to control territories that are valuable for
the production, processing and trafficking of drugs: areas suitable for drug cultivation,
strategic locations (e.g. ports, border-crossings), and consumer markets (Osorio, 2015;
Caldero´n et al., 2015). Since deals among criminal groups are hard to enforce, DTOs
commonly aspire to retain monopolistic control of these turfs. Our theory argues that
DTOs require active collaboration from the community in order to retain control of
these valuable territories: this cooperation provides DTOs with information as simple as
who enters and leaves the territory and as complex as who in the community might be
supplying information to the state or cooperating with other criminal groups.
As is the case with armed rebels, pure coercion is not sufficient for gathering the type
of information that is necessary to keep their turf safe (Kalyvas, 2006). Following Olson
(1993), Metelits (2009) and Arjona (2017), our theory argues that DTOs will be better
able to establish collaborative arrangements when they control a region and expect to
control it in the future. Under monopolistic control, DTOs can be more confident of
reaping future gains if they continue to show restraint, and they may even provide a
share of those gains to the community to ensure its continued cooperation.
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A second factor we consider is DTOs’ relationship with the state. These criminal
organizations need some level of informal state protection to successfully produce, pro-
cess, and traffic drugs (Snyder and Duran-Martinez, 2009; Arias, 2017). We hypothesize
that violence against the community (in the form of disappearances, kidnappings, death
threats, forceful recruitment, and extortion) should be more prevalent where local crim-
inal groups operate with the complicity, tolerance, acquiescence, and/or cooperation of
the state. When DTOs collaborate with law enforcement agents and the police, these
aforementioned crimes will likely go unpunished, allowing DTOs to operate extortion
networks with complete impunity.
A third set of variables that influence how DTOs interact with the community focuses
on leadership style and organizational structure. Los Zetas, for example, is a loosely
organized criminal group with hundreds of criminal cells operating in a semi-autonomous
fashion all over the county. The Sinaloa cartel, in contrast, has traditionally been more
centralized and is organized around a handful of powerful drug capos. In principle, a
DTO that has leadership stability and is hierarchical should be better able to restrain its
armed cells than a criminal organization that is more decentralized.
A related factor is the disruption of hierarchical systems. As existing literature sug-
gests, the Mexican federal government’s drug war strategy to arrest or kill drug capos has
resulted in negative externalities such as an increase in violence (Phillips, 2015; Caldero´n
et al., 2015; Guerrero, 2011b). The neutralization of a DTO’s leadership breaks chains of
command, reduces DTOs time-horizon, and increases territorial contestation. According
to our theory, these processes generate more predation on the part of DTOs.
A last factor considers the characteristics of the turf and the logistics of the local
criminal enterprise that likely influence DTO behavior toward the population. Turf can
be distinguished in terms of logistics and value. Border-crossings are extremely valuable
territories in Mexico, given the value of the US drug consumption market. Controlling
these turfs is very profitable –and also challenging because of the high amount of com-
petition from criminal rivals. Keeping control of these turfs in border-crossing areas
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might require more community collaboration – and hence assistance – than transit areas
where drugs are moved from production zones to their destination through dirt roads,
high-speed highways, and other transportation hubs.
Our approach builds on and expands the emerging literature on criminal governance.
In contrast to Arias (2017), our paper does not consider whether any characteristics of
civil society and civilians at large affect the ability of criminal organizations to coerce or
assist local communities. We offer a theory and evidence about how two of the charac-
teristics of micro-armed regimes highlighted by Arias (2017) – inter-cartel competition
and patterns of state-DTO collaboration – influence criminal groups’ behavior toward
the community.
Our account expands on Felbab-Brown et al. (2017), who argue that armed groups
–including DTOs – often engage in limited public goods provisions to gain legitimacy
within the community. In their approach, armed group behavior is influenced, among
other factors, by levels of territorial control as well as strategic factors related to the
value of controlling certain territories. In contrast to their approach, our paper moves
beyond narrative by relying on survey and statistical evidence to support our claims.
To test our theory, we conducted a series of list experiments embedded in a proba-
bilistic nationwide survey. The survey was carried out in Mexico in July 2011. We focus
on experimental questions that assess extortion by DTOs and the use of DTO assistance.
These questions are sensitive in that individuals may feel social pressure or even fear, if
asked about these topics directly, which would then influence their reported preferences.
We therefore asked these questions through list experiments.
To measure the critical explanatory variable of territorial contestation, we use Coscia
and Rios (2012)’s dataset on Mexican DTOs’ areas of operation. The authors developed a
Web crawler to extract information from Google News on the activity of criminal groups
in Mexico. We also use additional measures of contestation, including executions among
rival DTOS, homicides rates, and homicides by firearms.
To test our hypotheses, we use the multivariate regression models of survey data
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for list experiments as proposed by Imai (2011) and Blair and Imai (2012). We specify
a linear model with identical covariates to examine the dynamics of civilian extortion
and assistance by DTOs. The results match our theoretical expectations. DTOs extort
civilians primarily in contested territories, where various DTOs fight for control of drug
production, trafficking, and distribution. In contrast, DTOs provide assistance – and they
extort at significantly lower levels – in territories controlled by a single DTO. Moreover,
our results demonstrate that the highest levels of extortion are observed in contested
municipalities with high levels of inter-cartel violence.
Our results also show that, controlling for levels of inter-cartel contestation, the party
in control of the local government shapes DTO behavior. Extortion is lower in states and
municipalities governed by the National Action Party (PAN), where national authorities
developed coordinated interventions to confront DTOs, than in states governed by the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which is known for a history of negotiating
informal protection rackets with DTOs (R´ıos, 2015; Astorga and Shirk, 2010; Shirk and
Wallman, 2015; Dura´n-Mart´ınez, 2015). Surprisingly, the highest levels of extortion are
found in states governed by the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD).
Our results also demonstrate that DTO organization and leadership stability shape
criminal group behavior toward the community. Less hierarchical DTOs exhibit sig-
nificantly higher levels of extortion and less assistance than more hierarchical criminal
organizations. Moreover, our results show that drug capo arrests are associated with
significantly less assistance, which suggests that leadership stability is a key factor that
enables DTOs to establish collaborative relationships with the community.
Finally, border crossings that require more community collaboration in order to main-
tain control are associated with more assistance than transit points. Drug producing turfs
are associated with less extortion.
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section identifies the puzzle and presents some
evidence from the Mexican context. The second section provides testable hypotheses and
generates a theory by drawing on the literature on civil war and mafia crime. The third
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section describes our methods and presents our empirical results and conclusions.
2 The drug war and increase in criminal extortion
In recent years, due to a shifting drug supply and the war on drugs, the environment in
which DTOs in Mexico operate has changed significantly, and DTOs have become more
violent and have also expanded their operations into areas of criminality.
The production and transportation of drugs out of Mexico has increased dramatically,
and, at the same time, conflict and competition with DTOs has increased. Crackdowns
in Colombia and the Caribbean (Bagley, 2012; Shirk and Wallman, 2015) produced a
larger market share for DTOs in Mexico. 3 At the same time, Mexican politics have
shifted: during the long period of dominance by the Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI), deals with DTOs existed throughout the country; due to the party’s hierarchical
organization and discipline, these deals could be enforced without much violence. Some
have even suggested that these pacts secured a state-sponsored division of territory among
DTOs (Grillo, 2011). However, contested power upended these deals, both at a local level
in the 1990s and, when the National Action Party (PAN) won, at a national level in 2000
(Trejo and Ley, 2017; Shirk and Wallman, 2015; Astorga and Shirk, 2010; R´ıos, 2015;
Osorio, 2015; O’Neil, 2009). DTOs now had to negotiate protection with governors and
mayors without central oversight, and they began to form their own militias where state
protection was no longer guaranteed Trejo and Ley (2017). Moreover, President Felipe
Caldero´n initiated an aggressive campaign against the DTOs when he took office in 2006.
The federal strategy involved “joint operations” that sent thousands of military troops
and federal police to combat DTOs; this approach also relied on a “leadership strategy”
that targeted DTO leaders and their lieutenants. In 2009, the government released a
list of Mexico’s 37 most wanted drug lords, and by January 2011, the army, navy, and
3It is estimated that more than 90% of the cocaine that is bound for the US passes through Mexico.
Moreover, in recent years, Mexican DTOs have grown their share of the heroin market, increasing the
cultivation of opium for heroin production. Together, Mexican DTOs traffic more than an estimated
quarter-million pounds of heroin into the US (DEA, 2015).
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federal police had captured or killed 20 out of the 37 (twice the number of kingpins
captured during the two previous administrations).The federal system has complicated
this strategy (Dura´n-Mart´ınez, 2015) because local leaders control many of the levers
in the system and can use them at the command of DTOs. For example, 90 percent
of police officers are under the command of state and municipal authorities (Guerrero,
2011b), and governors both control state prosecutors and have a strong influence in the
judiciary. Even if local authorities are not in charge of prosecuting crimes related to drug
trafficking, they provide allies who have local information and serve as first respondents
to most crimes; they can therefore influence which crimes get investigated as well as who
is prosecuted or indicted (Trejo and Ley, 2017).
DTOs have also undergone several changes that resulted from the shifting market
and war on drugs. First, especially as the government arrested and killed DTO leaders,
large DTOs fractured into smaller ones (Guerrero, 2011a; Phillips, 2015). This also
increased the number of groups. Mexican authorities4 have detected at least nine DTOs
and more than 37 criminal cells, in addition to hundreds of youth gangs working directly
or indirectly with the cartels.
These structural changes, and other shifts, also increased violence. Overall, violence
related to DTOs has increased, due to these changes (including Caldero´n’s policies) (Guer-
rero, 2011a,b; Escalante, 2011; Dell, 2015; Caldero´n et al., 2015; Osorio, 2015; Coscia and
Rios, 2012; Lessing, 2015). Figure 1 shows the number of homicides from 2002 to 2015 in
the country. Deaths are classified according to whether they are drug-related homicides
(see Section 5.2 below) or murders that affect the general population (light area). A sharp
increase in violence is noticeable with the onset of the drug war, most of it due to inter-
cartel conflict. Using a quasi-experimental empirical approach, Caldero´n et al. (2015)
show that targeting leaders produces systematic increases in violence between DTOs and
violence affecting the surrounding communities. Much of this violence is located in strate-
gically important areas for DTOs and is still conducted by just a handful of DTOs. In
4Data from the Procuradur´ıa General de la Repu´blica.
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Figure 1: Total homicides, 1990-2015
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Notes: The graph shows the total number of homicides in Mexico from 1990 to
2015 as reported by the National System of Health Information (SINAIS). The
black area corresponds to the total number of ”deaths presumably related to
criminal rivalry,” as reported by the federal government. The gray area shows
the difference between the two series.
this environment, DTOs fight each other for control of territory that is valuable for the
production, transportation, and trafficking of drugs to the most profitable markets, most
prominently the U.S.
Another important change has been the diversification of strategies used by DTOs in
this environment. Before 2006, DTOs mostly focused on trafficking drugs to the U.S.;
now, however, they engage in many other crimes including extortion, human trafficking,
and kidnapping. For example, the number of cases of extortion reported to local public
prosecutors’ offices increased from 3,157 in 2006 to 5,127 in 2015.
Government collaboration is increasingly evident in many of these activities. In its
2017 report, Amnesty International claims that forced disappearances, a “generalized
practice” in Mexico, are committed with the participation of state agents (AI, 2017).
The ”burning fields” operated from inside the prison in Piedras Negras (mentioned ear-
lier) seems to have occurred with the complicity of the local government – the evidence
suggests that the Zetas bribed the governor, the state prosecutor, and local police in
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Figure 2: Reported cases of extortion and business theft, 2000-2015
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Coahuila so they could kidnap, vanish, and otherwise threaten the population with im-
punity.5 Likewise, a report by an Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts of
the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights implicates local officials, and perhaps
also federal police and armed forces, as complicit in a massive student disappearance
from Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers College in September of 2014. The relationship between
DTOs and officials, especially at the local level, allows much of their use of violence and,
potentially, their diversification of tactics.
We argue that competition between DTOs for drug trafficking territory in Mexico,
produced by a combination of these factors, generates many of the incentives for extortion;
this has supplanted cooperative relationships with communities in many cases. Extortion
also depends, however, on local governments that are either too weak to confront or too
eager to collude with DTOs.
5From Proceso by Cedillo (2017).
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3 Theoretical framework
To explain the logic of DTO strategies toward civil society, we start with the assumption
that DTOs are primarily business organizations – albeit illegal ones – whose main goal
is the production, transport, and sale of a good. To pursue this goal, DTOs aspire to
control valuable territories, including areas suitable for drug cultivation, routes to move
drugs from production zones to consumer markets (mainly in the U.S.), and hubs along
these lines (including ports and border crossings6).
DTOs rely at times on community collaboration to maintain and contest territory. At
a minimum, to operate in secrecy, DTOs require that the community does not inform the
state or rival DTOs of their presence. Information about when and where DTOs conduct
their operations, who leads them, or where they hide between operations presents risks of
being caught by the state or outmaneuvered by rival DTOs and, subsequently, a loss of
territory. On the other side of this calculation and in order to accomplish their territorial
goals, DTOs can use more active community cooperation. DTOs cannot monitor all of
the territory they seek to control, and, in particular, they cannot monitor all the actions
of individuals in these territories. They need locals to provide them with information
on who enters and leaves the territory, who is working with the state or rival DTOs, or
who is trafficking drugs without paying their “taxes.” DTOs, then, want to obtain the
community’s silence and, at times, direct collaboration.
Overall, we build a theory on this idea that DTOs seek to profit. We assume that
DTOs want to maximize their payoff from their business. We then argue that interactions
with the community depend on the circumstances surrounding their territorial control as
well as their organizational features and relationship with the government.
6Ports are usually the primary entry point for cocaine coming from South America and for chemicals
coming from China needed to produce methamphetamine.
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3.1 Territorial control
DTO’s current territorial control, as well as its expected control over time, are critical for
understanding its behavior toward civilians. Drawing on Olson (1993), Metelits (2009),
and Arjona (2017), we formulate the following hypothesis: if a DTO is in control of a
region and expects to remain in control, it will develop self-restraint and even provide
some share of the benefits from their trade to the population in order to maintain loyalty,
enhance its legitimacy, and increase its capacity through continued control (Iannaccone,
1992; Berman et al., 2011; Berman and Laitin, 2008; Felbab-Brown et al., 2017). We are
building on ideas that coercion is costly and fails to produce full cooperation in many
cases. For example, a community may keep silent because its members fear torture or
even death if they report on the DTO. However, as is the case with rebel groups and even
governments, this strategy may not produce active community collaboration (Kalyvas,
2006; Wood, 2003; Arjona, 2017; Mampilly, 2011). Obtaining high-quality intelligence
about their territory may require self-restraint and even reciprocation of benefits, rather
than coercion (Wood, 2003), which, at the extreme, can also backfire and inspire a strong
campaign by a community against the DTO (Kalyvas, 2015). We therefore expect a
DTO with this type of monopoly to cooperate, or at a minimum, restrain itself in its
interactions with the communities in which it operates.
In contrast, we expect competition between DTOs for territorial control to be accom-
panied by increases in civilian extortion for several reasons. First, territorial contestation
shortens time horizons, incentivizing armed groups to behave more as “roving” bandits
rather than as “stationary bandits” (Olson, 1993). DTOs do not anticipate that they
will be in control for long in these cases, so they reap as much as possible while they are.
In addition, when armed groups compete for territorial control, sustaining cooperative
relationships with the community becomes more difficult because competition creates a
common pools problem: why would a criminal group restrain from preying on the com-
munity through extortion (or other negative behavior toward the population) when they
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expect other criminal groups not to restrain themselves (for which, potentially, all of
the DTOs operating in the community may also be blamed) (Humphreys and Weinstein,
2006)? In the extreme, competing DTOs can commit so much abuse that citizens will
refuse to pay extortion fees – or will migrate – because no criminal organization can cred-
ibly offer protection. Third, because fighting an active challenger is costly, DTOs facing
contested territorial control may also adjust to declining profits from their “core” business
by diversifying into a host of other criminal activities, including extortion, kidnapping
for ransom, human trafficking, and theft. With the exception of extreme scenarios where
profits from some of these activities dry up, these activities provide greater profit than
drug trafficking alone in the short-term.
Based on this discussion, we not only expect that DTOs should be more prone to
extortion when they are vying for territorial control, but also that extortion should be
most pronounced where DTOs use violence against each other. This violence not only
typically shortens time horizons: it also imposes financial costs, which encourages DTOs
to turn against the population to extract resources, as just described. Additionally,
turf wars tend to empower the most violent contingents of DTOs, who may then either
shape group behavior or even start operating on their own, with little restraint in their
interactions with the community.
At the same time, when DTOs increase extortion, they also tend to stop providing
benefits to communities: DTOs reap fewer rewards from information when a rival has
clearly invaded an entire area, rather than when these rivals only have secret ties or subtle
incursions into mainly monopolistic territories. DTOs may also be less likely to receive
credit for providing assistance to these communities. Moreover, once violence spreads,
DTOs typically also have fewer resources with which to provide assistance. Finally, as
less violent contingents of DTOs are disenfranchised, their preferred policies of providing
benefits from their trade to the community may also be overruled.
Overall, then, we theorize that DTO monopolistic control should be associated with
lower rates of extortion and higher rates of public service provision. Conversely, com-
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petition among rival criminal gangs should be associated with higher rates of extortion
and lower rates of service provision, especially when violent conflict breaks out between
DTOs.
3.2 DTO relationships with the state
A second factor we consider is the relationship between DTOs and the state. In many
cases, criminal groups ”must find ways to work with the state or receive protection
from the state to function” (Arias, 2017, p.10). Some forms of DTO-state collaboration
generate low levels of violence – for example, the symbiotic relationship between the
PRI and DTOs during the era of one-party rule allowed the state to control the division
of territory among the limited number of large DTOs. But, in contrast, when DTOs
compete against each other and establish collusive pacts with different parts of the state
to buy impunity, high rates of violence follow.
In terms of community collaboration, we theorize that complicity between DTOs and
law enforcement institutions –prosecutors, judges and police – can produce impunity that
encourages extortion and other criminal activity. When DTOs extort, steal from, kidnap,
or even make individuals disappear, the community cannot access legal punishment if
the police, prosecutors, and judges are colluding with the criminals. Drawing from the
economics of crime literature (Becker, 1968; Stigler, 1970), we hypothesize that higher
levels of collaboration with law enforcement institutions are associated with a higher
probability that DTOs will engage in extortion and other criminal activities affecting the
community, given that this lower DTOs’ costs of engaging in these behaviors.
Mexico’s federal system also exhibits variation in the relationships between DTOs
and the state. At the extreme, local authorities are at times too weak to resist or even
demand concessions from DTOs, which become de facto rulers. In other states, local (or
even regional and national) authorities cooperate with, and in some instances submit to,
DTOs. Finally, some states resist DTO corruption and capture. We lack reliable measures
15
about degree of local state collaboration, but the party controlling the governorship and
the municipality serve as reasonable proxies. As Trejo and Ley (2017) argues, PAN
governments have adopted policies to undo the informal protection deals that DTOs had
established during PRI control. Moreover, during the Calderon administration, PAN-
controlled states had more federal resources, including the armed forces and the federal
police to fight DTOs (Dura´n-Mart´ınez, 2015). This meant that states governed by the
PAN under President Caldero´n were not only more inclined to undo corrupt deals with
DTOs, but they were also more able to resist DTOs because they received more resources
to do so. We therefore expect less extortion from DTOs in states with PAN incumbents
during the Caldero´n administration, the period we focus on in this paper.
In contrast, we expect PRI incumbents to be more willing to sustain informal protec-
tion deals created under the one-party rule (R´ıos, 2015; Blume, 2017; Trejo and Ley, 2017;
Shirk and Wallman, 2015). In these places, we expect that collusive agreements between
DTOs and governors, local prosecutors, and police are more likely to persist, translate
into higher levels of impunity, and, in turn, produce higher levels of DTO extortion.
With respect to other political parties like the left-wing Party of the Democratic
Revolution (PRD), we do not have clear expectations. On the one hand, local PRD
governments might behave much like the PAN in that, when they take office, they dis-
rupt informal protection deals between the PRI and DTOs. On the other hand, the
PRD lacked the federal resources provided to PAN states, which made them significantly
weaker. Existing literature has shown that PRD governments have been disproportion-
ately targeted by DTOs for assassination (Trejo and Ley, 2016; Blume, 2017). Politicians
get killed for a variety of reasons, including (1) accepting money from a criminal group
and then getting caught in fighting between DTOs; (2) refusing to cooperate with crim-
inal organizations; or (3) having a political opponent with DTO-connections (Blume,
2017). If these arguments are correct, PRD governments’ vulnerability to assassinations
may also suggest involvement in these states in DTO capture. We might therefore expect
higher levels of extortion among PRD governments.
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3.3 Leadership style and organizational capacity
Beyond territorial competition among DTOs and state collaboration with DTOs, we
theorize that leadership style and organizational characteristics also change the chances
that DTOs will engage in extortion. Mexican drug cartels are large criminal networks
centered on one or several capos who control a number of regional bosses. Regional
bosses, in turn, control cities, towns, rural regions, and the routes for drug distribution.
Regional bosses hire local commanders who then control the sicarios (soldiers). Sicarios
are assisted by halcones (falcons), who are lower-ranked cartel members who patrol local
territories (Grillo, 2011).
Beyond these general characteristics, however, DTOs vary in their use of organiza-
tional hierarchy and this also changes over time. Some cartels such as the Sinaloa Cartel
and Gulf cartels are organized hierarchically. Other cartels such as the Zetas and the Car-
tel Jalisco Nueva Generacio´n are decentralized. These are loose associations of various
criminal groups, rather than a strictly structured top-down group.
DTOs also vary in their size, from criminal cells that are mostly local (e.g., Guerreros
Unidos or Los Ardillos), to regional networks (e.g., La Familia Michoacana, The Beltra´n
Leyva Organization, and the Tijuana Cartel), to national and transnational criminal
enterprises (e.g., the Sinaloa Cartel, the Zetas, and the more recent Cartel Jalisco Nueva
Generacio´n).
Building on insights that hierarchical structures can better overcome principal-agent
and other disciplinary problems (e.g. Shapiro (2013)), we argue that, in principle, less
hierarchical DTOs should have more problems disciplining their criminal cells and soldiers
and less capacity to engage in collaborative relationships with the community; this should
then translate to more extortion and less assistance.
Moreover, in principle, criminal organizations with stable leadership should be better
able to control armed men than DTOs that suffer leadership turnover. Leadership stabil-
ity creates longer-term time horizons, which are necessary to develop ongoing cooperative
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relationships with the community (Olson (1993)) and to engage in governance provision
(Felbab-Brown et al. (2017)), because a stable leader knows that he will still be in control
in the future to reap the rewards of investment in a community.
As argued above, DTOs in Mexico have suffered increasing rates of leadership turnover
in the last decade, which, in turn, has shifted their focus from a strategy of trafficking
drugs while maximizing collaboration with the community to a strategy of diversifying
their portfolio to other crimes to increase their immediate profit. This metamorphosis
was in part the unanticipated result of President Caldero´n’s (2006-2012) ‘’beheading”
strategy. When violent gangs are either separated from capos who know how to traffic
drugs or are forced out of drug trafficking, they turn to other mechanisms to generate
profits, including extortion. We therefore expect lower levels of assistance and higher
levels of extortion among DTOs that suffer leadership turnover.
3.4 Characteristics of turf
Beyond the characteristics of the criminal organization, some characteristics of their turf
might influence DTO behavior toward the population. Territories vary in their value
and in the logistics of the local criminal activity. These might influence how DTOs
engage with the community. In our statistical models, we will control for three types
of turfs. First, drug producing areas, which in the Mexican context mainly include
regions that allow marijuana and poppy cultivation. Growing these crops might require
continued cooperation from the local community and might therefore be associated with
more assistance.
Second, transit points or turf that allows DTOs to transport drugs within the country.
In the Mexican context, these include dirt roads, small highways, and even high-speed
freeways or airstrips. Because of the high degree of mobility, these operations are less
embedded in the community and rely instead on ”halcones” and some deals with states.
Transit points might therefore be associated with less assistance.
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Third, border-crossings allow for drug smuggling across countries. Border-crossings
are incredibly valuable turf in Mexico because of the value of the U.S. drug market, which
is estimated to be around 100 billion annually (Kilmer et al., 2014). Control of this type
of turf might require more active community collaboration, not only to keep trafficking
points secret – for example, the location of hidden tunnels used to smuggle drugs – but
also for intelligence. Monopolistic control of these locations is critical to DTOs, and so
they want information about any other operations occurring in these crossings, including
their use without permission or ‘’tax” payments, or any designs on them by rival DTOs.
We therefore expect that DTOs will offer significant assistance with this type of turf.
Based on our theoretical discussion, we empirically test the following hypotheses.
Our main independent variable shapes extortion and assistance in opposite directions,
so that more contestation and more inter-cartel violence increase extortion and reduce
assistance. For our other independent variables, our theory has strong implications for
either extortion or assistance, and sometimes both. We articulate each hypothesis here.
H1: Extortion by DTOs is higher and assistance lower in places contested by
DTOs.
H2: Extortion by DTOs is higher and assistance lower in places of high inter-
cartel violence.
H3: Extortion is higher where DTOs have collaborative relationships with the
state.
H4: Extortion is higher and assistance lower among DTOs that have high
leadership instability.
H5: Extortion is higher and assistance lower among more decentralized and
less hierarchical DTOs.
H6: Assistance is higher where DTOs engage in drug production.
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H7: Assistance is higher around border crossings than around other drug
trafficking corridors.
4 Implementation
4.1 List experiments and survey design
There is a significant literature on the problems related to measuring citizens’ engagement
in and attitudes toward crime and civil conflict (Warr, 2000; Stylianou, 2003; Kalyvas
and Kocher, 2009; Bullock et al., 2011; Mosher et al., 2011; Lyall et al., 2013; Matanock
and Garcia-Sanchez, 2014; Bruck et al., 2016). The highly sensitive nature of these topics
motivates all actors involved to hide information.
The literature suggests maximizing the incidence of truthful responses to sensitive
issues with unobtrusive measures, including list experiments. (Blair and Imai, 2012;
Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012; Imai, 2011; Sniderman, 2011; Glynn, 2013; Holbrook and
Krosnick, 2010; Corstange, 2009; Kuklinski et al., 1997a,b; Sniderman and Grob, 1996).7
We conducted a series of list experiments in a nationwide survey carried out in Mexico
in July 2011.8
It is important to note that the extortion questions are framed as issues of avoiding
harm. Respondents understood we were not simply asking about transactions involving
the purchase of drugs, the payment of private security guards, or the ubiquitous practice
7A list experiment creates two groups of individuals, a control and a treatment group, assigned
randomly from the overall sample so that the two groups are equivalent. Individuals in the control group
are shown a list of n items. The treatment group receives the same list with the n items plus an additional
‘’sensitive” item that we seek to measure. Interviewees are then asked to specify a number of items they
have/do/agree with but not to mention which specific items. The difference of the mean item responses
between the control and treatment groups provides an adequate estimate of the aggregate proportion of
the population that has/does/agrees with the sensitive item. For more detailed explanations, see Blair
and Imai (2012); Imai (2011); Glynn (2013); Corstange (2009).
8The survey was collected in collaboration with the polling unit at the Office of the Mexican Pres-
idency. The design of the survey was entirely our own. Our sole commitment to the polling unit was
to share our results. The enumerators were from a survey company, and we trained them on how to
conduct list experiments. We do not believe our collaboration with Mexican officials affected answers
because enumerators introduced themselves as part of the academic team and explained that the goal
of the project was academic research. We worked closely with our institutional review board (IRB) to
design the survey and all of our procedures.
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of bribing traffic policemen.
Table 1: Description of List Experiments
Card 1 Card 2
Introduction
to all
groups
Please tell me how many of these
things you have done in the past
six months. We just want to know
how many you have done, do not
tell me which ones.
Please tell me how many of these
things you have done in the past
six months. We just want to know
how many you have done, do not
tell me which ones.
Control
Group
1. I got drunk at a party I went
to.
1. I have received benefits from
the Oportunidades program.
2. I did some exercise outdoors. 2. I have participated in a tanda.*
3. I attended church almost every
Sunday.
3. I gave charity (limosna).
Treatment
Group 1
4. I have seen cars or trucks
with armed men who are not
policemen in broad daylight.
4. I have given money to
drug or criminal organiza-
tions so that they protect me.
Treatment
Group 2
4. I asked for help from
someone working for orga-
nized crime.
4. I have given money to
the police so that they pro-
tect me.
* Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA).
We randomly selected 300 sampling points from the 65,000 electoral precincts that
exited in Mexico in 2011. The sample was stratified by type of electoral precinct (urban
and rural or semi-urban) as defined by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), and by levels
of drug-related violence at the municipal level (low, medium, and high) for a total of six
strata.
Our strategy was to oversample areas of high violence in order to guarantee sufficient
spread across areas of differing degrees of DTO dominance. We used the “Deaths Pre-
sumably Related to Criminal Rivalry” (SEGOB, 2011) dataset published by the Mexican
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government to stratify our sample. The dataset classifies deaths into three categories:
1) Homicides resulting from violence between DTO members (Executions); 2) Killings
from clashes between the Mexican authorities and DTOs (Confrontations); and 3) Deaths
related to unexpected attacks by DTOs on Mexican authorities (Aggressions).9 We clas-
sify the level of inter-cartel violence using the total number of drug-related deaths in
municipalities from January to May of 2011.
Drug-related deaths are highly concentrated in a few places: half of these deaths
occurred in 19 municipalities during the study period, while about two thirds of the
municipalities reported no executions between DTO members. Given this distribution,
we classify the high-violence group as the five most violent municipalities, which have
a third of the total deaths related to criminal rivalry.10 The medium-violence group
includes the next 14 municipalities with most drug-related deaths, so that both groups
together account for half of the homicides. The low-violence group comprises the rest of
the municipalities (n=2,437).11
Within each strata, we sampled electoral precincts with a selection probability pro-
portional to its population size using the quartiles of the distribution of the number of
registered voters, for a total of 22 groups.12 We collected 9 questionnaires in each sam-
pling point. Respondents were randomly assigned to one control group and two treatment
groups of similar size for a total of 900 observations in each group and 2,700 observations
for the whole sample. Summary statistics by treatment group and balance tests are shown
in Table A1 in the Appendix. Given the randomization strategy, regional characteristics
are identical across groups. There were small differences in education, age, and gender
9Each case was classified by a special council integrated by members of the army, navy, federal
police, ministry of interior, and the general public prosecutor’s office. We are aware that the data
might underestimate drug-related deaths; as will become apparent below, we use a variety of alternative
measures of violence as to check the robustness of our models.
10By design, about half of the sampling points in these places fell in rural precincts outside of the main
urban conglomeration.
11The entire state of Tamaulipas (area in grey) had to be left out of the sample to protect our
enumerators due to the intensity of violence during the study period.
12We used two groups of population size (above and below the median) for rural districts with high
levels of violence.
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across groups that are taken into account in the analysis.
4.2 Testing the list experiment
List experiments rely on two assumptions: (a) no liars, and (b) no design effects. Floor
and ceiling effects can generate “liars” if an individual has performed none or all of the
actions listed; he or she may lie so as to not reveal that he or she has performed (or not
performed) the sensitive item. Thus, all of the lists are designed to include items rarely
expected from the same individual, so that most individuals will have performed at least
one of the control items but not all of them (as noted above).
The other assumption inherent in the list experiment is that there is no “design effect.”
That is, adding an item to the list will not have an effect upon the responses for the other
items on the list. A “design effect” would entail that the items are not independent from
each other.
We follow Blair and Imai (2012) to formally test that the identification assumptions
for list experiments hold. Suppose that in a list experiment there are J control items and
a single sensitive item J + 1. Let Zij be an indicator variable of whether individual i has
a preference for item j or, as in our experiment, she has been exposed to such situation.
Let Yi(0) =
∑J
j=1 Zij and Yi(1) =
∑J+1
j=1 Zij represent the potential answers respondent i
would give to the list experiment under the control and treatment conditions, respectively.
Finally, let Z∗i,J+1 be the truthful answer to the sensitive item.
The “no design effect” assumption implies that Yi(1) = Yi(0) + Zi,J+1(1), while the
“no liars assumption” entails that Zi,J+1(1) = Z
∗
i,J+1. Under both assumptions, the mean
difference estimator is an unbiased estimate of the proportion in the population with
an affirmative preference for (or exposure to) the sensitive item. Moreover, under these
assumptions, it is possible to estimate the joint distribution of (Yi(0), Z
∗
i,J+1), where each
type of respondent type is represented by piyz = Pr(Yi(0) = y, Z
∗
i,J+1 = z). In particular,
if Ti is the treatment status of individual i, then piy1, which is the estimated proportion of
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respondents in the sample that have been exposed to y control items and to the sensitive
item, can be estimated as:
piy1 = Pr(Yi ≤ y | Ti = 0)− Pr(Yi ≤ y | Ti = 1). (1)
Consequently, the proportion piy0 of respondents that have been exposed to y control items
but not to the sensitive item can be inferred from the difference between the estimated
mass probability Pr(Yi = y | Ti = 0) and piy1.
All of the experiments were piloted in advance to avoid potential identification threats.
The distribution of answers for each experiment for the control and two treatment groups
are shown in Table 2. The table also shows the estimated piy1 for each experiment.
According to these estimates, approximately 9.7% of the (unweighted) sample has been
extorted by DTOs, while 11.9% have received help from them. The prevalence of DTO
activities is evident, with a remarkable 38.2% of respondents estimated to have seen
armed convoys during daylight hours. Also interesting among these summary statistics,
and quite worrisome, is that police extortion is estimated to be even higher than criminal
extortion.
Under the assumption of no design effects, we should expect the cumulative distribu-
tion of y in the control group to be greater than or equal to the corresponding distribu-
tion under the treatment (Blair and Imai, 2012). Nevertheless, this distribution should
be greater by at most one item at each level y. Algebraically, these two hypotheses are
equivalent to the null hypothesis that piyz ≥ 0 for all y and z. Since this is the case
for each list experiment, we conclude that there is no evidence of design effects in our
survey.13
The low proportion of respondents in the two control groups for which Yi(0) = 3
also confirms that the experiments have no ceiling effects. The absence of design effects
13We also use the procedure proposed in Blair and Imai (2012) that compares two tests for stochastic
dominance using the Bonferroni correction. As expected, we fail to reject the null hypothesis with a
Bonferroni-corrected p-value for each list experiment equal to 1.
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(i.e., the inclusion of the sensitive item does not seem to reduce the number of reported
items) and the positive estimated proportions pi11 are clear indicators of the absence of
substantial floor effects.
Table 2: Answer distribution of list experiments
Card 1
Control Group Treatment Groups
Convoys Help from crime
Yi Freq. Prop. Freq. Prop. piy,1 Freq. Prop. piy,1
0 148 16.6% 108 12.1% 4.5% 127 14.2% 2.4%
1 424 47.5% 293 32.7% 19.3% 391 43.7% 6.2%
2 265 29.7% 346 38.6% 10.4% 300 33.5% 2.3%
3 56 6.3% 113 12.6% 4.0% 68 7.6% 1.0%
4 36 4.0% 9 1.0%
Total 893 100% 896 100% 38.2% 895 100% 11.9%
Card 2
Control Group Treatment Groups
Narco extortion Police extortion
Yi Freq. Prop. Freq. Prop. piy,1 Freq. Prop. piy,1
0 181 20.2% 171 19.1% 1.1% 161 17.9% 2.3%
1 505 56.4% 465 52.0% 5.6% 470 52.4% 6.3%
2 167 18.7% 202 22.6% 1.7% 207 23.1% 1.9%
3 42 4.7% 45 5.0% 1.3% 55 6.1% 0.4%
4 12 1.3% 4 0.4%
Total 895 100% 895 100% 9.7% 897 100% 10.9%
Notes: The table shows the number respondents and the distribution of answers for each
outcome and treatment group. The table also shows the estimated proportion of each
respondent type piyz = Pr(Yi(0) = y, Z
∗
i,J+1 = z) under the no-design effect and no-
liars assumptions (see Imai 2011), where Yi(0) represents the total number of affirmative
answers for control items and Z∗i,J+1 denotes the truthful occurrence of the sensitive item.
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5 Empirical analysis of DTO Strategies
5.1 Average effects
Our baseline linear model to measure the prevalence of DTO extortion and assistance in
our sample is as follows:
yij = α + β1Ti +
∑
k
δkXik +
∑
l
γlZjl + ij (2)
where yi is the number of items reported by the respondent i in municipality j and
Ti is an indicator variable for treatment. The model also includes k individual covariates
and l socio-economic characteristics at the municipality level.
The results of the list experiments show a significant presence of DTOs, including
their use of both extortion and assistance strategies toward the communities in which
they operate. Table 3 shows our estimated coefficients for each of the four list experi-
ments described above. The estimated coefficients of the models in the first column are
equivalent to those of a simple difference in means test. The models in column (2) adjust
for the sampling design using individual sampling weights, and the models in column (3)
also include individual and regional socio-economic characteristics.
Our results show that, on average, one in ten Mexicans were extorted by criminal
organizations in the six months prior to the survey. Police extortion seems to be as
prevalent as criminal extortion. The prevalence rate of help from criminals is twice as
high once we adjust for our oversampling of violent places. This suggests that narco
help, as we demonstrate below, is more prevalent in places with low levels of violence.
Finally, our results indicate that almost half of the Mexican population had seen a non-
state armed convoy during daylight in the months prior to the survey. The security
situation certainly does not represent stable state control. Column (3) shows that our
results are not substantially affected when adjusting for slightly imbalanced individual
characteristics.
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Table 3: Average Effect of List Treatment
Average effect
Treatment (1) (2) (3)
Card 1
Convoy 0.38 *** 0.46 *** 0.45 ***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07)
Help from criminals 0.12 *** 0.23 *** 0.22 ***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Card 2
Criminal extortion 0.10 ** 0.13 ** 0.12 **
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Police extortion 0.11 *** 0.14 ** 0.17 ***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06)
Sampling weights No Yes Yes
Individual covariates No No Yes
Regional covariates No No Yes
Notes: The rows show the estimated coefficients of four different list experiments
included in the Survey on Public Safety and Governance in Mexico in 2011. There
were two questions (card 1 and 2) for which respondents were randomly assigned into
one control and two treatment groups (see Table 1). The coefficients are estimates
of the proportion of the survey sample exposed to the sensitive item. The models
in Column (2) adjust for sampling weights, and the models in Column (3) include
individual and regional socio-economic characteristics. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. *** : p < 0.01, ** : p < 0.05, * : p < 0.1.
5.2 Explanatory variables
In order to test the specific hypotheses derived from our theory, we use a multivariate
regression model of survey data for list experiments as proposed by Imai (2011) and
Blair and Imai (2012).14 We specified a linear model with identical covariates for the two
treatments analyzed in this paper, inquiring into the dynamics of extortion by DTOs and
the assistance also provided by these criminal groups. The baseline models are similar to
the ones described in equation 2 but also include interaction variables of the treatment
indicator with each of the individual and municipal characteristics. We adjusted our
baseline specification as follows:
14We use the List package for R (Blair and Imai, 2012).
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yij = α + β1Ti +
∑
k
(δk + τkTi)Xik +
∑
l
(γl + ηlTi)Zjl + ij (3)
where τk and ηl are the coefficients for the interaction terms between the treatment
indicator and the k individual and l regional characteristics, respectively.
Our theory highlights DTO territorial contestation as key independent variable shap-
ing DTO behavior. To measure DTO contestation, we use Coscia and Rios (2012)’s 15
data on areas of operation of Mexican DTOs. As noted above, those authors used a Web
crawler to extract information on the activity of criminal groups in Mexico from Google
News. This consists of panel data where each column is a dummy variable indicating
whether a given DTO was present in a municipality during a certain year. The data are
available at the municipal level from 1990 to 2010.
For our analysis, a municipality is ‘’contested” if two or more groups have a dominant
presence; a municipality is a monopoly if only a unique, dominant group only has a
presence. We estimate that, between 2008 and 2010, DTOs had a monopolistic presence
in 10.9 percent of the municipalities (n=268) and contested an additional 4.9 percent
(n=120). We estimate that more than half of the population lived in a municipality with
a dominant presence of at least one criminal group (59% of the population lives in this
15.8% of municipalities), from which less than half lived in contested territories (27% of
the population lives in the other 84.2% of municipalities).
We stratified municipalities by levels of violence (“Low”, “Medium”, and “High”) as
described in Section 4. Table 4 below shows that all high-violence municipalities in our
sample were contested and all low-violence municipalities had no DTO activity, which
make us more confident about our measure of territorial control. Maps in Figure A1 of
the Appendix show areas of dominant presence for selected DTOs. Figure 3 displays our
sampling points and the estimated number of cartels in each municipality.
Our theory argues, furthermore, about the importance of arrests of DTO’s leadership.
15We thank Viridiana Rios in particular for facilitating our access to the original dataset.
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Figure 3: DTO dominance and sampling points
Notes: The graph shows the geographic distribution of 300 sampling points of the Sur-
vey on Public Safety and Governance in Mexico conducted in 2011. Sampling points
are colored according to the level of drug-related violence in each municipality (“High”,
“Medium,” and “Low”). The first two categories include the most violent municipal-
ities and concentrate, respectively, a third and a half of the total number of deaths
related to criminal rivalry from January to May 2011, as reported by the government
SEGOB (2011). The figure also shows the number of dominant DTOs in each municipal-
ity between 2008 and 2010. The areas were estimated using the Coscia and Rios (2012)
database, which describes the yearly territorial presence of criminal groups using Google
News queries. We define a cartel as having had a dominant presence in a municipality if
it has had operations (it appears in the database) in every year between 2008 and 2010.
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This may matter either because it increases DTO violence or because it changes the
structure of the organization. We include a dummy variable to indicate whether a drug
capo or lieutenant was captured in a municipality within the last three years (January
2008 to May 2011). We use Caldero´n et al. (2015)’s dataset and update it up to 2011
with data from Guerrero (2011a).
Our theory also argues that state capture by DTOs is potentially important. We
therefore control for indicators of which party controlled a municipality, an important
proxy as described above. We estimate the effect of a municipality controlled by the PAN
or the PRI, with the PRD as the base category.16 We also present a second model where
we interact territorial control by DTOs with party incumbency. Moreover, following
studies that stress the importance of coordinated efforts to fight – or protect – DTOs,
(Dura´n-Mart´ınez, 2015), we examine cases where the same party controls the state and
the municipality.
We also control for whether there was a military joint operation in place at the time
of the survey. These operations were coordinated efforts between the military and police
forces (federal, state, and local) to regain state control and reestablish the rule of law in
places overridden by violence and criminal activity. This also indicates federal resources
directly used against DTOs in these states. At the time of the survey, there were 6 joint
operations in 9 states.
To test for the effects of DTO organization, we classify these groups according to
their hierarchical organization (“Standard”, “Regional” or “Clustered”), drawing from
the United Nations Office of Drug Enforcement’s typology of crime organizations (UN-
ODC, 2002). Standard hierarchy groups are the most common form of organized crime
organizations. They are characterized by a single leader with a direct line of command
to regional bosses and a clearly defined hierarchy where systems of internal discipline
are strict. The Sinaloa Cartel, prior to the arrest of ”El Chapo” Guzma´n in 2016, and
16This group also includes very few electoral precincts where there was party alternation between
January and June of 2011. The analysis does not change if these are excluded.
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the Jua´rez Cartel typify this classification. Regional hierarchy groups are characterized
by a single leadership structure and a clear line of command from the center – but they
also have an important degree of autonomy at the regional level. The Gulf Cartel typ-
ifies this classification. Clustered hierarchy groups are formed by component criminal
organizations or gangs that have a governing arrangement between these affiliates. Each
component has a higher degree of autonomy than those in the other two types of organi-
zations. Los Zetas typifies this classification.
Classifying groups into these categories is done using information produced through
surveys by the United Nations Office of Drug Enforcement’s typology of crime orga-
nizations among security experts and organizations from sixteen member countries, in
combination with existing literature and journalistic accounts.
DTO organization is subject to frequent changes when members are captured, killed,
or otherwise removed. Our classification corresponds to how DTO organization looked
in 2011, when the survey was collected. To further test these characteristics, especially
should the reader disagree with our classification, we ran our models using our catego-
rization as well as simply an indicator for each individual DTO.
Our theory also argues that the characteristics of turf matter, including suitability
for drug production, transportation infrastructure, and distance to the U.S. border. We
use information on the Mexican transportation network and available information on
government seizures to measure these, respectively.17 Our theory distinguishes between
the following territories: drug-producing, transportation, and border-crossings. We define
a municipality as a “drug producer” if at least five hectares of crops of marijuana or
opium poppy were eradicated by the government between January 2010 and May 2011. A
municipality is a potential “transit point” if it has strategic transportation infrastructure,
in particular airports, ports, and/or highways. Finally, a municipality is a potential
“crossing point” if it has one of the more than 30 known border crossings to the United
17Data on transportation infrastructure is available at the National Institute of Statistics and Ge-
ography (INEGI). Data on government seizures is available via the Mexican Freedom of Information
Act.
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States.
We also include a dummy variable indicating whether the polling point (electoral
section) is considered urban according to Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute and a vari-
able indicating the municipal level of development by using the marginalization index
constructed with 2010 census data (CONAPO, 2010).
The models below also include individual variables that allow us to highlight groups of
respondents that show distinctive patterns, and to control for any imbalance in random-
ization. We include a full set of demographic variables – sex, age, occupation (including
unemployment), education, and recipient of social transfers through the Oportunidades
program as a proxy for poverty – that control for individual characteristics which may
affect citizens’ likelihood of being victimized.18
Table 4 presents summary statistics of municipal characteristics by the degree of
territorial contestation between DTOs for all municipalities in Mexico. Column 1 shows
summary statistics of contested municipalities. Columns 2 and 3 show the difference for
places with monopolistic control and no dominant DTO, respectively.
We also include in the table extortion-related complaint rates at local public prose-
cutor offices as reported by the Secretarido Nacional de Seguridad Publica (SNSP). We
use this data as an alternative measure for extortion in subsequent sections, comparing
it with our reported rates through the list experiment in our survey.
18We do not include self-reported income in the main tables because this variable tends to be very
unreliable as a proxy for poverty. We did collect this information, though, and the results do not vary
when included.
32
Table 4: Municipal characteristics by level of DTO’s contestation
Units Period Contested Monopoly No cartel
mean (diff) (diff)
(1) (2) (3)
Violence and extortion1
Executions total 08-11 153.06 -119.95 *** -149.88 ***
Executions rate 08-11 20.53 -4.44 -14.84 ***
Homicides rate 08-11 33.63 -3.89 -16.96 ***
Hom by firearms males 19-39 rate 08-11 93.72 -20.79 -56.32 ***
Extortion (SNSP) rate 08-11 3.65 -1.28 ** -3.11 ***
Socioeconomic characteristics
Urban municipality perc 2011 0.71 -0.15 *** -0.40 ***
Population thou 2011 253.83 -118.60 *** -231.76 ***
PAN mayor perc 2011 0.30 -0.04 -0.07 *
PRI mayor perc 2011 0.53 -0.02 -0.16 ***
Other mayors perc 2011 0.17 0.06 0.24 ***
Marginalization index unit 2010 -1.01 0.38 *** 1.15 ***
Low marginalization perc 2010 0.72 -0.14 *** -0.48 ***
Medium marginalization perc 2010 0.20 0.02 0.03
High marginalization perc 2010 0.08 0.12 *** 0.44 ***
Human development index unit 2010 0.84 -0.03 *** -0.08 ***
Illiteracy perc 2010 0.08 0.02 *** 0.10 ***
Schooling years 2010 7.71 -0.68 *** -1.87 ***
Drug trafficking indicators2
Producer perc 08-11 0.18 0.03 -0.03
Transit point perc 2011 0.57 -0.15 *** -0.44 ***
Border crossing perc 2011 0.07 -0.04 * -0.06 ***
Road distance to USA km 2011 795.73 87.51 * 272.45 ***
Joint operation perc 2011 0.54 -0.15 *** -0.32 ***
Leader capture perc 08-11 0.06 -0.01 -0.05 ***
Opium poppy eradication plots 08-11 14.96 68.42 -0.54
Marijuana eradication plots 08-11 65.23 37.17 -52.99 ***
Cocaine seizures kgs 08-11 96.91 50.74 -72.14 **
Heroine seizures kgs 08-11 1.78 1.71 -1.48 ***
Marijuana seizures tons 08-11 10.18 2.85 -9.13 ***
Municipalities total 120 268 2068
Notes: The table shows socioeconomic characteristics, drug trafficking indicators, and violence and
extortion rates at the municipal level according to the number of DTOs with reported activities. Con-
testation was estimated using the Coscia and Rios (2012) database, which maps the yearly territorial
presence of criminal groups using Google News queries. We define a cartel as having had a dominant
presence in a municipality if it has had operations (as it appears in the database) in every year between
2008 and 2010. A territory is contested if two or more cartels have had a dominant presence. 12: Data
from 08-11 corresponds to the period between January 2008 and May 2011. Rates from 2011 were
annualized to estimate average yearly rates across municipalities.
It can be seen that violent conflict between DTOs and territorial contestation are
highly correlated. Contested territories are more violent than those with monopolistic
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control and even more with respect to places with no DTO activity, both in total number
of deaths and rates per hundred thousand inhabitants (using alternative measures for
violence). Similarly, extortion-related complaint rates at local public prosecutor offices
are also higher in contested places.
With respect to socioeconomic characteristics, the differences in Table 4 also suggest
that territorial contestation tends to happen in urban and more developed places, with
strategic transportation infrastructure, and closer to the US border. In contrast, monop-
olies are more prevalent in rural and poorer areas. Nevertheless, they seem to grow more
crops of marijuana and opium poppy and transit almost twice the drugs than contested
places, although none of these differences were statistically significant.
Interestingly, kingpin captures tend to happen equally between contested municipali-
ties and those under monopolistic control, but state action in the form of joint operations
tends to focus on contested places. It is worth noting that there are no differences in
incumbent parties between these two types of territories. Nevertheless, municipalities
with no DTO dominant presence tend to have fewer PRI governments.
5.3 Territorial control
Table 5 below shows the estimated coefficients for the experiments on DTO extortion
and assistance. To untangle the relationship between contestation and violent conflict
between DTOs, we estimated three models for each experiment: one using our proxy for
territorial contestation, a second using our categories of the level of DTO violence, and
a third interacting both variables. For interpretation purposes, we use as the baseline
category places of high violence, all of them contested in our sample. We also group places
of medium and low violence into a single category to make comparisons on interacted
variables more intuitive.
The coefficients for monopolistic control, lower violence, and their interaction are
negative and significant in Columns 1 through 3, indicating higher levels of extortion
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by criminal groups in contested and high violence areas as compared to less violent
areas under monopolistic control. These results support our theory about the effects of
territorial contestation increasing and monopoly control decreasing extortion.
In contrast, the coefficients in the last three columns of Table 5 show that, as predicted
by our theory, areas of monopolistic control are associated with more assistance from
criminal groups. Moreover, the model in column (6) predicts more help in places under
monopolistic control and low violence than in those with no dominant presence of DTOs
and low violence.
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Table 5: Estimates on narco extortion and help
Narco extortion Narco help
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sensitive item
Violence and contestation
Monopoly -0.13** 0.18***
(0.05) (0.07)
No cartel 0.13 0.18
(0.10) (0.12)
Low violence -0.14** 0.08
(0.06) (0.07)
x Contested -0.10 -0.03
(0.08) (0.09)
x Monopoly -0.19*** 0.16**
(0.05) (0.08)
x No cartel 0.05 0.16
(0.11) (0.14)
Government interventions
Joint operation 0.19** 0.13* 0.15** 0.13 0.14 0.11
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Leader capture -0.14*** -0.06 -0.10 -0.21*** -0.25*** -0.20***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Characteristics of the turf
Drug producer -0.12** -0.12** -0.11* -0.02 -0.04 -0.02
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Transit point 0.07 0.00 0.06 -0.16* -0.18** -0.17*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Border Crossing -0.03 -0.12** -0.07 0.17** 0.23*** 0.16*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Other controls
PRI mayor -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 0.01 -0.07 0.02
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
PAN mayor -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.11 -0.04
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Urban 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.16** 0.16** 0.16**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Marginalization-Med 0.03 0.06 0.05 -0.20 -0.19 -0.19
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Marginalization-High -0.00 0.11 0.01 -0.28** -0.22* -0.28**
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13)
Observations 1,778 1,778 1,778 1,782 1,782 1,782
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.08
Notes: The rows show estimated coefficients for the sensitive item of two list experiments
included in the Survey on Public Safety and Governance in Mexico in 2011. There were
two questions (card 1 and 2) for which respondents were randomly assigned into one
control and two treatment groups (see Table 1). A full coefficient table is available upon
request. All models include individual level characteristics. Robust standard errors by
municipality in parenthesis. *** : p < 0.01, ** : p < 0.05, * : p < 0.1.
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In terms of the other covariates in the model, leadership arrests have a significant and
substantial negative coefficient for assistance. These results support the idea that DTOs
with stable leadership can better sustain collaborative relationships with the community.
The capture of a national or regional leader does not seem to influence extortion, contrary
to our expectations. The effect of drug capo arrests on extortion appears to be mediated
through how these cause significant increases of inter-cartel violence, as demonstrated
by (Caldero´n et al., 2015) and (Phillips, 2015). More inter-cartel violence, in turn, is
associated with more DTO extortion.
The models in Table 5 control for joint operations, where we find significantly higher
levels of extortion. There is substantial debate in the literature about whether joint
operations directly caused violence or if, instead, they were assigned to places where
violence was already escalating (Escalante Gonzalbo, 2011; Merino, 2011; Rosas, 2011).
Our results cannot determine causality, although they do demonstrate that places where
joint operations took place are also associated with significantly higher levels of extortion.
Finally, we find significantly more assistance in border-crossings and less assistance
in transit points, in support of our theory. Drug-cultivating areas exhibit less extortion
and, contrary to our expectations, we do not find more assistance here.
The party controlling the municipality has no effect on extortion nor help. In subse-
quent sections, we find strong effects when accounting for the party controlling the state,
which suggests that governors more than mayors are a key determining factor. In terms
of individual-level variables, we found higher rates of extortion affecting poor, middle-
aged males with medium levels of education. In contrast, we found that the poor and
elderly population tend to receive the most help from narcos. We did not find significant
differences by sex or between other age groups.
Figure 4 below shows the average predictions from the full interacted model. For
ease of interpretation, we present predicted values and their 90% and 95% confidence
intervals. As expected, the model predicts a 22% incidence of extortion in contested
municipalities with high levels of violence and the lowest prevalence in places under
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monopolistic control. The model also predicts a 17% prevalence of narco help in the later
municipalities, significantly different from zero.
Figure 4: Predicted rates of DTO extortion and co-optation
Notes: The figure shows predicted rates of DTO extortion and assistance, and their 90% and 95%
confidence intervals, for two list experiments included in the Survey on Public Safety and Governance
in Mexico in 2011. There were two questions (card 1 and 2) for which respondents were randomly
assigned into one control and two treatment groups (see Table 1). A full coefficient table is available
upon request. All models include regional socio-economic characteristics and robust standard errors.
5.4 DTO relationships with the state
Our theoretical approach stresses that, conditional on levels of contestation, DTOs will
be able to extort more if they collaborate with local law enforcement. In Mexico’s federal
system, gaining collaboration from governors is critical because they appoint local pros-
ecutors and police, which in turn shapes which crimes get investigated and prosecuted
(Trejo and Ley, 2017). Moreover, following a strand in the literature that stresses the
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importance of coordinated efforts to fight or protect DTOs (Dura´n-Mart´ınez, 2015), this
section presents models on partisan control of governors and mayors.
Table 6 shows the estimated coefficients of our models of the effects of partisan control
on DTO extortion and assistance, and Figure 5 displays the predicted rates of Models 1
and 3. As described, the baseline scenario is a contested territory with a PRD governor.
Consistent with our theory, results show that areas with a PAN governor have significantly
lower extortion rates, especially those with a co-partisan mayor. Municipalities under this
PAN juxtaposition also have the lowest predicted rates of extortion for both contested
and monopolized territories (not shown here). We do not find significant differences for
PAN-controlled municipalities with respect to help.
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Table 6: Estimates on narco extortion and help by incumbent party
Narco extortion Narco help
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sensitive item
PRI gov other may -0.01 0.03
(0.07) (0.10)
PRI gov and may -0.15* 0.13*
(0.08) (0.08)
PAN gov other may -0.23*** 0.07
(0.08) (0.10)
PAN gov and may -0.24*** -0.03
(0.09) (0.08)
Contested
x PRI gov other may 0.04 0.19
(0.11) (0.16)
x PRI gov and may -0.14 0.22**
(0.11) (0.10)
x PAN gov other may -0.26** 0.16
(0.11) (0.11)
x PAN gov and may -0.23* 0.11
(0.12) (0.10)
Monopoly -0.09* 0.20***
(0.05) (0.06)
x PRI gov other may -0.16 0.24
(0.11) (0.18)
x PRI gov and may -0.28*** 0.42***
(0.09) (0.09)
x PAN gov other may -0.33*** 0.48**
(0.12) (0.20)
x PAN gov and may -0.23** 0.14*
(0.09) (0.08)
x Other incumbents -0.08 0.22
(0.14) (0.19)
No cartel 0.15 0.17
(0.09) (0.12)
Observations 1,778 1,778 1,782 1,782
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.09
Notes: The rows show estimated coefficients for the sensitive item of two list
experiments included in the Survey on Public Safety and Governance in Mexico
in 2011. There were two questions (card 1 and 2) for which respondents were
randomly assigned into one control and two treatment groups (see Table 1).
A full coefficient table is available upon request. All models include individual
level characteristics. Robust standard errors by municipality in parenthesis.
*** : p < 0.01, ** : p < 0.05, * : p < 0.1.
Moreover, in line with our theoretical expectations, PRI-governed states show signifi-
cantly higher extortion rates than PAN-controlled areas. The difference in the predicted
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rate of extortion in places with PRI juxtaposition, relative to places with PAN juxtapo-
sition, is more than 20 percentage points. Noticeably, we also find the highest predicted
rates of DTO assistance when the PRI holds both the municipality and the governorship.
Surprisingly, the highest levels of extortion are found in the baseline scenario, that
is, PRD-controlled governorships. This seems to be consistent with the argument that
PRD governments were easy prey for powerful DTOs without federal government backing
during Caldero´n’s presidency, either through killing a disproportionate number of their
mayors or, apparently, coercing or capturing them to impose a predatory criminal order
without much state restraint.
Figure 5: Predicted rates of narco extortion and help by incumbent party
Notes: The figure shows predicted rates of DTO extortion and assistance, and their 90% and 95% con-
fidence intervals, for the two list experiments included in the Survey on Public Safety and Governance
in Mexico in 2011. There were two questions (card 1 and 2) for which respondents were randomly
assigned into one control and two treatment groups (see Table 1). Full coefficient table is available
upon request. All models include regional socio-economic characteristics and robust standard errors.
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5.5 Leadership style and organizational capacity
This section explores the role of criminal organization on DTO strategies toward the popu-
lation. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the areas of operation of selected drug-trafficking
organizations between 2008 and 2010 using the Coscia and Rios (2012) database. The
figure also displays if the areas are under monopolistic control or under contestation
according to our definitions above.
Table 7: Estimates on narco extortion and help by type of DTO hierarchy
Narco Narco
extortion Help
Sensitive item
Standard x Contested 0.09 -0.14
(0.06) (0.16)
Sinaloa x Contested 0.10 -0.11
(0.06) (0.15)
Juarez x Contested1 -0.17 -0.22
(0.11) (0.16)
Regional x Contested
Golfo x Contested 0.05 0.05
(0.19) (0.32)
Clustered x Contested 0.14** -0.20***
(0.06) (0.07)
Zetas x Contested 0.22* -0.38***
(0.11) (0.10)
Familia x Contested 0.35* 0.01
(0.18) (0.16)
Tijuana x Contested 0.15*** -0.11
(0.06) (0.11)
Beltran Leyva x Contested 0.03 -0.24***
(0.08) (0.07)
Notes: The rows show estimated coefficients for the sensitive item of two list
experiments included in the Survey on Public Safety and Governance in Mexico
in 2011. There were two questions (card 1 and 2) for which respondents were
randomly assigned into one control and two treatment groups (see Table 1).
Groups are classified according to their hierarchical organization (Standard,
Regional or Clustered) drawing from the United Nations typology of crime or-
ganizations (UNODC, 2002). 1: All municipalities with dominant presence of
the Jua´rez cartel were contested during the period of study. A full coefficient
table is available upon request. All models include individual level character-
istics. Robust standard errors by municipality in parenthesis. *** : p < 0.01,
** : p < 0.05, * : p < 0.1.
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Conditional on levels of contestation, we expect higher levels of extortion and lower
assistance among clustered hierarchy groups than among standard and regional hierarchy
groups. To test these hypotheses, we run an individual model for each type of organization
(Standard, Regional, Clustered). The model includes a dummy variable indicating the
presence of that particular type of organization interacted with our variable for territorial
contestation (Monopoly, Contested, No Cartel).
The coefficients in Table 7 show the estimated differences in DTO extortion and
assistance between contested and monopolistic areas of operation of the corresponding
organization. The table also reports coefficients for models where each DTO is treated
separately.
The results are broadly consistent with our theoretical expectations. Clustered crim-
inal groups exhibit significantly higher levels of extortion under conditions of territorial
contestation, as reflected in the negative and statistically significant coefficient for the
interaction of these variables. In terms of assistance, we also find significantly lower levels
provided by clustered DTOs. We do not find evidence that standard and regional hier-
archy groups engage in significantly more extortion or less assistance under conditions
of high territorial contestation. We should emphasize that our findings probably under-
estimate the levels of extortion for Los Zetas and the Gulf DTOs: as mentioned above,
we were not able to collect surveys in Tamaulipas, where these two groups have fought a
bloody turf war.
In combination with the evidence above that capo removals matter, this evidence sug-
gests that DTO organization has important effects on interactions with the community.
5.6 Robustness tests and external validity
Our empirical approach uses a set of variables and definitions for violence and territorial
contestation. In this section, we use alternative measures for the dependent and some of
our independent variables as well as other data sources as robustness checks. Tables 8
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and 9 show the estimated coefficients of alternative models for narco extortion and help.
First, we use alternative measures for violence. Columns (1) in both tables replicate
our analysis using the tertiles of the average annual rate of drug-related executions from
2008 to May 2011 as our measure for violence. Although we believe that the total number
of executions is a more direct measure of the intensity of the inter-conflict, we present
this model to account for population size. As before, we use contested municipalities with
high levels of violence (last tertile) as the baseline scenario. We observe once again that
DTO extortion is lower and help is more prevalent in places with monopolistic control.
Some critics of government data on drug-related deaths argue that it suffers bias from
underestimation or misclassification of cases. The database only includes cases with an
open investigation from the federal or local public attorney offices and known by the
federal authorities, and their inclusion in the database might change if they no longer
meet the established criteria (SEGOB, 2011). Therefore, in Model 2 we use homicide rates
by firearms of males between 15 to 39 years old (SINAIS, 2011). This series has some
advantages: 1) homicide data comes directly from death certificates, reducing potential
underestimation biases, 2) homicides in this group of age and gender best reflect the geo-
temporal variance of reported executions between criminal groups (Caldero´n et al., 2015),
and 3) homicides by firearms are directly related to drug-related violence, since most of
the executions occur in this modality. Using this series as our measure of violence, we
found very similar results to those in our baseline model.
The models in Column 3 do not rely on external data for our measures of violence and
contestation at the municipal level. Instead, we use a measure of local violence directly
taken from our survey. We asked our respondents: “From a scale from 0 to 10, where 0
means no violence and 10 means the worst level of violence, how would you grade violence
in your locality?” We estimated the average grade at the precinct level and defined our
categories of violence (Low [0-3], Medium [3-8], and High [8-10]). This measure could
also be conceived as a proxy of territorial contestation, given that it is to be expected
that respondents would answer that they observe more violence where DTOs contest a
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territory. We observe again that extortion is less prevalent and help from narcos more
frequent in localities with medium and low violence.
The second strategy in our robustness checks is to use alternative measures of terri-
torial contestation. Our baseline measure defines that a cartel has a dominant presence
in a municipality if it has had activity in that place for at least three consecutive years
(2008-2010) using the Coscia and Rios (2012) database based on online news articles. We
chose the window of three years to avoid overestimating the number of cartels because of
temporary or single events within a year that do not necessarily reflect DTOs’ control or
influence over a municipality.19 As a robustness check, we present in column (4) of Tables
8 and 9 our baseline model using the number of DTOs in 2010 (the last year available) as
reported in Coscia and Rios (2012). We observe once again that extortion is significantly
lower in places of low violence, with the highest reduction in places where a single cartel
operates. The coefficient for help is also positive and substantive (but not significant) for
this scenario.
An alternative dataset on DTO’s area of operation comes from Osorio (2015). The
author bases his analysis on online articles from local and national newspapers and gov-
ernment reports and uses a supervised coding protocol for text analysis and automated
identification of event data.20 The database identifies drug-related events by type (ex-
ecutions, confrontations, government interventions, etc.) and actors involved, including
criminal groups. Column (5) in both tables presents models using our baseline definition
for territorial contestation but using Osorio’s dataset on the number of DTOs. Results
show that extortion is significantly lower in contested places with low violence versus
places with high violence. In this model, however, we did not find significant effects for
extortion and help for the monopoly scenario.
It is worth noting that the Coscia and Rios (2012) and Osorio (2015) datasets differ
19For example, some captures of kingpins occurred when they were in transit in municipalities outside
they area of operation. The Coscia and Rios database would have a positive entry for these cases linking
the municipality and the DTO.
20The Eventus ID protocol was developed by (Osorio and Reyes, 2014).
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considerably after 2004. The number of municipalities with at least one DTO in the first
dataset more than doubles the number reported in the second dataset. Moreover, there
is a group of municipalities in the Osorio (2015) dataset that reports no DTO presence
but have high levels of executions and homicides, as measured with official statistics.21
Finally, to demonstrate the external validity of our findings, the last three columns in
Table 8 present models with alternative measures of extortion at the municipal level using
an extended sample of municipalities in Mexico. The model in Column 6 uses official data
on extortion rates in 2011 as reported by the Mexican Government (SNSP, 2011). The
database contains the number of cases of extortion with a pre-trial or full investigation
as reported by local public prosecutor offices from all municipalities in Mexico. The
estimated coefficients confirm our results that extortion rates are considerably higher
in contested areas than those under the monopoly and no cartel scenarios. Similarly,
coefficients show that violence intensifies the prevalence of this criminal activity in the
later scenarios.
Data from reported cases severely underestimates crime incidence since most of the
crimes go unreported due to fear, insecurity, and lack of trust in the government. An
alternative strategy is to rely on self-reported data from victimization surveys. The last
two columns in Table 8 show similar models using questions about extortion included
in the 2011 National Victimization Survey as the dependent variable (ENVIPE, 2011).
The survey asks respondents if they have been victims of extortion in the last six months
or if there has been extortion in their neighborhood. The variables are expressed as the
number of people reporting extortion per thousand inhabitants using population weights
from the victimization survey. Once again, we observe that the worst scenario for civil
society is that of two or more criminal groups engaging in violent confrontation for control
of the drug market. In fact, the predicted rate of individual extortion for the contested-
high-violence scenario (50.3) is at least 20% greater than those for the monopoly (41.1)
21Acapulco is the most extreme case, as Osorio’s dataset reports no DTO activity there between 2000
and 2010. The city was the second most violent place in Mexico in 2011 after Ciudad Jua´rez and the
fifth most violent between 2008 and 2011.
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and no-cartel (38.8) low-violence scenarios. We observe similar results the prevalence of
extortion in the neighborhood is used as the dependent variable.
5.7 The need for list experiments
Our data make an important broader point beyond this particular paper: crime appears
to be systematically underreported in Mexico. Comparing crime incidents reported to
local public attorney offices (SNSP) and victimization surveys (ENVIPE) in 2011, we
estimate that underreporting bias is as high as 87.2% for common crimes and 93.2%
for extortion. Even victimization surveys can suffer from underreporting if citizens feel
unsafe revealing predatory or abusive behavior by criminal groups or the police.
Our estimates for criminal extortion in 2011 reveal that at least 12% of the population
living in contested territories have been extorted by criminal groups. This compares to
the 6% of respondents in contested areas giving the same answer when asked directly in
the national victimization survey. Our estimate is only closer to the 17% of the popula-
tion reporting extortion in their neighborhoods throughout DTO-contested places. This
comparison of extortion rates reveals the advantages of using experimental methodolo-
gies like the item count technique to increase truthful responses when measuring criminal
incidents.
6 Conclusions
Mexican DTOs have shifted their activities: they no longer focus primarily on the ship-
ment of illegal drugs to international markets, and instead have diversified into criminal
activities that prey on citizens such as extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking, and the
collection of protection money.
The paper develops a theoretical framework to understand DTO strategies of ex-
tortion and cooperation in their interactions with the civilian population. Four factors
influence DTO behavior toward the communities where they work: i) degree of territorial
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contestation and violent conflict between DTOs; ii) collaboration with the state and law
enforcement; iii) DTO organization and leadership stability; and iv) the characteristics
of the local turf.
When DTOs are in firm control of their territories, they can behave as more benign
stationary bandits and offer assistance to the community. But as these criminal orga-
nizations violently compete for control of territory and trafficking routes, the incentives
to turn against citizens and extort resources increase. In this respect, DTO behavior
resembles behavior by rebel groups.
A second factor that influences DTO behavior toward the community is the degree of
government collaboration and/or collusion. In contrast to insurgents, DTOs do not seek
to topple the state; instead, they traffic drugs and engage in other illicit activities –such
as extortion – to extract profits. DTOs often find ways to receive protection from the
state and buy impunity from law enforcement to perform these activities. Holding levels
of contestation constant, the more DTOs are protected by the state, the more criminals
can engage in illicit activities to harm the population without facing legal sanctions.
Our approach elaborates and refines Snyder and Duran-Martinez (2009), who argue
that illicit markets can be peaceful when state-sponsored protection rackets form. The
reality, however, is that there can be collusive agreements between DTOs and the state
that are peaceful –for example, the symbiotic relationship between the PRI and the
narcos during the era of one-party rule – and collusive agreements with the state that are
extremely predatory. The most predatory criminal order is found where DTOs violently
compete against each other and where DTOs can count on the collaboration with, or
protection from, law enforcement. Under these conditions, victimized citizens can’t turn
to the state for legal retribution because the police, prosecutors, and courts are working
for, or protecting, criminals.
Other factors that shape DTO behavior are criminal organization and leadership
stability. More hierarchical criminal organizations that are headed by strong and stable
leaders are better able to control their armed criminals from terrorizing the communities
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where they work. Hierarchical organizations with leadership stability also have longer
time-horizons that allow them to make investments in communities, offering assistance
to the members of the communities in exchange for restraining the use of violence.
The Mexican federal government attempted to subdue DTOs by assaulting their or-
ganization from the top down and fragmenting them into smaller groups. However, the
efficacy of this strategy rested on the assumption that violence would not affect the popu-
lation while “criminals would exterminate each other.”22 That assumption turned out to
be highly mistaken: disorganized crime became significantly more dangerous for Mexican
society than organized crime.
Lastly, we have offered a theory about DTO behavior that accounts for the value of
the territory or turf, as well as its logistics, for DTO behavior. Holding the levels of
territorial competition constant, we have argued that DTOs cooperate more with the
population in areas where local criminal activity requires more community collaboration
for the DTO to keep control of territory. We have highlighted a distinction between
border crossings and transit points. Keeping control of the former require more active
community collaboration than the latter, and hence DTOs are more likely to engage
in assistance there than in transit points. Our expectation was that DTOs would also
engage in more assistance in drug-producing territories, but the data did not support
this claim. Further research is necessary to better understand how the nature of the turf
–and in particular drug production – influences DTO behavior toward the community.
To support our theoretical approach, the paper used list experiments to explore the
sensitive questions about extortion and assistance from DTOs. Our statistical models
provide evidence of the pervasiveness of DTO extortion in regions that are contested
and suffer high levels of inter-cartel violence. We also offered evidence that DTOs behave
differently where PAN, PRI, or PRD control the state and the municipality. The estimates
also provided evidence that DTO organization, leadership stability and the value and
22Personal interviews with a high-security official during the Caldero´n presidency that asked to remain
anonymous.
49
logistics of the turfs matter. We presented evidence, moreover, that the patterns hold
using a variety of measures of inter-violence. Finally, to demonstrate the external validity
of our findings, we presented models with alternative measures of extortion, including
official data on extortion rates in 2011 as reported by the Mexican Government (SNSP,
2011) and extortion data derived from victimization surveys.
Taken together, our theory and empirical evidence advance knowledge about DTO
behavior toward the population. Our paper presents a compelling explanation of why
citizens are increasingly living in fear in Mexico. Lethal violence is not the only or
most pervasive danger for the general population. Citizens are trapped in networks
of extortion and coercion where DTOs prey on them, often with the acquiescence or
direct collaboration of local states and law enforcement agents. Federalism complicates
Mexican security dilemmas because it creates many potential sources for DTOs to buy
off institutional protection and impunity. Mafia states describe an increasingly prevalent
micro-criminal order in Mexico, one where DTOs contest violently for control of local
turfs and where criminals extort, kidnap, rape, and terrorize the community with the
acquiescence – or direct collusion - of local states and their security apparatuses.
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Table 9: Robustness checks: help from DTOs
Source Survey
Dependent List
variable experiment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High violence
x Monopoly 0.21*** 0.19*** - -
(0.08) (0.07)
x No cartel 0.18 0.25 - -0.25**
(0.16) (0.17) (0.12)
Medium violence 0.14**
(0.07)
Low violence 0.13
(0.20)
x Contested 0.57*** 0.36* 0.09 0.02
(0.21) (0.21) (0.07) (0.06)
x Monopoly 0.24* 0.30* 0.23 0.03
(0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.08)
x No cartel 0.29** 0.26* 0.03 0.10
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13)
Observations 1,782 1,782 1,782 1,782 1,782
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08
Var for violence Executions Homicides by Violence in
rate, 08-11 firearms, 08-11 locality 2011
Var for contestation Coscia & Rios, None Coscia & Rios, Osorio,
2008-2010 2010 2008-2010
Notes: Columns (1) to (5) show estimated coefficients for the sensitive item of a list experiment
included in the Survey on Public Safety and Governance in Mexico in 2011. Respondents were
randomly assigned into one control and two treatment groups (see Table 1). Data on executions
come from the “Deaths Presumably Related to Criminal Rivalry” dataset published by the Mexican
government (SEGOB, 2011). Data on homicides by firearms is based on death certificates (SINAIS,
2011). A full coefficient table is available upon request. All models include regional socio-economic
characteristics. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** : p < 0.01, ** : p < 0.05, * : p < 0.1.
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Appendix for
Living in Fear: The Dynamics of Extortion
in Mexico’s Drug War
Table A1: Summary statistics
Treatment Treatment
Variable Control Group 1 Group 2
% (diff) (diff)
(1) (2) (3)
Observations 900 900 900
DTO contestation and violence
Low violence 0.33 0.00 0.00
Medium violence 0.33 0.00 0.00
High violence 0.33 0.00 0.00
No cartel 0.15 0.00 0.00
Monopoly 0.23 0.00 0.00
Contested 0.62 0.00 0.00
Municipal characteristics
Urban locality 0.55 0.00 0.00
PAN mayor 0.19 0.00 0.00
PRI mayor 0.73 0.00 0.00
Other mayors 0.08 0.00 0.00
Joint operation 0.67 0.00 0.00
Leader capture 0.27 0.00 0.00
Drug producer 0.37 0.00 0.00
Transit point 0.79 0.00 0.00
Border Crossing 0.15 0.00 0.00
Marginalization Index-Low 0.88 0.00 0.00
Marginalization Index-Medium 0.06 0.00 0.00
Marginalization Index-High 0.05 0.00 0.00
Individual characteristics
Man 0.50 0.02 0.06 ***
Age 18-35 0.44 0.06 *** 0.03
Age 36-50 0.31 -0.00 -0.03
Age 51-65 0.16 -0.04 *** -0.01
Age 66 or more 0.09 -0.01 0.00
Edu-None or Primary 0.37 -0.05 ** -0.02
Edu-Secondary or High School 0.47 0.04 * -0.01
Edu-College or more 0.16 0.00 0.03 *
Oportunidades 0.23 0.00 -0.00
Peasant 0.07 -0.01 -0.01
Self Employed 0.17 -0.01 -0.00
Notes: The table shows summary statistics of 2,700 interviews in the Survey on Public Safety
and Governance in Mexico. Participants were randomly assigned into one control and two
treatment groups. Column (1) shows average characteristics in the control group. Columns
(2) and (3) show differences with respect to treatment groups. P-values of difference in means
tests are also shown: *** : p < 0.01, ** : p < 0.05, * : p < 0.1.
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Figure A1: DTOs’ areas of operation
Sinaloa Zetas
Golfo La Familia
Juarez Tijuana
Notes: The figure shows the areas of operation of selected DTOs between 2008 and 2010.
The areas were estimated using the Coscia and Rios (2012) database, which describes the
yearly territorial presence of criminal groups using Google News queries. We define a cartel
as having had a dominant presence in a municipality if it has had operations (as it appears
in the database) in every year between 2008 and 2010. A territory is contested if two or more
cartels have had a dominant presence.
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